Who is watching the watchers?
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Who is watching the watchers?

The CFTC, the prediction markets, and the deliberate dismantling of oversight.

There is a pattern to how institutions fail. It rarely happens all at once. It happens in
stages, each one defensible in isolation, each one making the next one easier. By the time
the failure becomes visible, the conditions that made it possible have been in place for
some time.

I want to talk about the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

The CFTC is the federal agency responsible for regulating prediction markets in the
United States. It is the body that should be investigating the suspicious trades placed
before presidential announcements. It is the agency whose investigation led, last week, to
the first criminal charge for prediction market insider trading in American history.

Since January, its workforce has been cut by 24%. It is now at its smallest size in fifteen
years.

This is not a coincidence of timing. It is the context in which everything else is
happening.

Let me set out what is known.

Gannon Ken Van Dyke, a US Army Special Forces master sergeant, has been charged
under what the CFTC calls the “Eddie Murphy Rule” — the prohibition on trading on
material, nonpublic information obtained from a government source in breach of a duty
of trust and confidentiality. He allegedly staked $33,000 and walked away with over
$404,000, trading under the Polymarket handle “Burdensome-Mix.”

Here is the detail that matters most: Van Dyke placed his bets not on Polymarket’s
domestic platform, where they would have been straightforwardly illegal, but on the

company’s offshore protocol. That offshore platform was fined $1.4 million by the CFTC
in 2022, on the condition that it bar US persons from trading. Polymarket’s apparent lax
enforcement of that ban is a core reason the offshore protocol commands such
significant market share in geopolitical wagering.

The loophole was known. It was fined. It was left open. And an active-duty warfighter
walked through it.

Kalshi, for its part, revealed that Van Dyke had tried to place the same trade on their
platform first — and was turned away. He then went offshore. The architecture of the
system directed him there.

There is a further detail that requires attention.

The CFTC chair told Congress that the platforms themselves are the “first line of
defence” against insider trading. The companies are required by law to self-regulate.
After the CFTC approves a platform to operate, the company self-certifies that its
individual offerings comply with federal law.

Self-regulation. Of platforms in which the president’s family has financial interests.
Donald Trump Jr. sits on Polymarket’s advisory board and has invested in the company
through his venture capital fund. He also advises Kalshi.

The CFTC chair overseeing this self-regulatory framework is 36 years old and Trump-
appointed. His agency has lost 24% of its workforce since January, including, in the
words of a former senior official, “people who were experienced and well-regarded. Real
enforcement lawyers were fired.” He told lawmakers he is trying to fill some of those
vacancies. He also said advances in artificial intelligence are streamlining the work for
the remaining employees.

Over $1 billion has been traded on geopolitical prediction markets since 2022. Volume
on Polymarket and Kalshi has more than doubled year on year. The markets are growing
faster than the agency meant to police them is capable of growing, even at full strength —
which it is not.

There is a counterargument worth taking seriously.

The economist who built the theoretical foundation for prediction markets argues that
insider trading is, in a sense, the whole point. Markets become more accurate when
insiders trade — because their information gets priced in. He notes that insider trading is
rampant in traditional financial markets, and the SEC prosecutes only a fraction of those
trades. Why, he asks, should prediction markets be held to a higher standard than Wall
Street?

It is a genuine argument. And it would be more persuasive if the information being
traded on were corporate earnings rather than classified military operations. The
difference between a trader who knows a company’s quarterly results before they’re
published and a soldier who knows about a raid before it happens is not a difference of
degree. It is a difference of kind.

Senator Adam Schiff said it plainly on the floor of the Senate: “There is no justification
for gambling on lives.” He added that bets on war could tip off US enemies — turning
prediction markets into a national security vulnerability as well as a financial one.

The Council on Foreign Relations put it more precisely: these markets offer an
unprecedented financial incentive for national security insiders to leak classified
information. The ultimate enforcement mechanism is not prosecution after the fact. It is
preemption — not listing these contracts in the first place. That is precisely the approach
regulators have abandoned.

I want to be precise about what I am and am not saying.

I am not claiming the CFTC staffing cuts were made specifically to impede the prediction
markets investigation. Agencies across the federal government have been cut. The CFTC
is not unique in that respect.

What I am saying is this: the effect of those cuts, whatever their intention, is that the
agency responsible for policing a rapidly growing multibillion-dollar industry — one now
at the centre of a criminal prosecution and multiple investigations — has significantly

less capacity to do that job than it had four months ago. The people who benefit most
from reduced oversight capacity have financial interests in the platforms being
investigated. The platforms are required to police themselves. And the loophole that
made Van Dyke’s trade possible was known, fined, and left open.

You do not need to allege conspiracy to find that combination of facts troubling.
Institutional failure rarely requires conspiracy. It requires incentive, opportunity, and
the gradual erosion of the structures designed to prevent it.

That is what forty years inside large institutions taught me. And it is what The Sovereign
Bet is built on.

There is a line in my novel — spoken by a character who has spent his career inside the
national security apparatus — that I keep returning to this week:

The architecture doesn’t need to be criminal to be corrupt. It just needs to make
corruption easy and accountability hard.

One prosecution does not dismantle an architecture. It may, in fact, serve to contain the
story within manageable boundaries — one bad actor identified, charged, and separated
from the system, while the system itself continues unchanged.

That is also what the novel is about.

The Sovereign Bet is available on Amazon Kindle. It is the first novel in a trilogy.

The second book is in progress. The world it is set in continues to provide the material.

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